Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used total income or total earnings. However, it is quite likely that it is changes in permanent rather than in transitory income that affects crime rates. The purpose of this paper is therefore to disentangle the two effects by, first, estimating region-specific inequality in permanent and transitory income and, second, estimating crime equations with the two separate income components as explanatory variables. The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on total crimes and three different property crimes, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect on any type of crime. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields mainly insignificant effects on crime.
Introduction
Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have typically used inequality in total income or total earnings as explanatory variables. However, income can be considered as consisting of two parts, one permanent and one transitory, and it is quite likely that it is changes in the permanent part rather than in the transitory part that affects crime rates, as the two have different ramifications for the duration of inequality. An increase in the dispersion of permanent income leads to greater income inequality in both the short-and the long-term. An increase in the dispersion of transitory income, on the other hand, only creates short-term inequality.
The purpose of this paper is to disentangle the effects from inequality in permanent income from the effects from inequality in transitory income on crime. This is done in two steps. In the first step, we estimate region-specific inequality in permanent and transitory income using a very rich dataset on Swedish individuals. While several previous studies have decomposed
year-to-year changes in inequality into its permanent and transitory components, this is the first time that these estimations have been carried out on a regional level. 1 In the second step, we estimate crime equations with the two estimated income components as explanatory variables. This is, as far as we know, the first time that this separation of income has been used in the literature estimating the effects of income inequality on crime.
The results indicate that it is important to separate the two effects; while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on property crime, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect on any type of crime.
When using a traditional, composite, measure of income, we get mainly insignificant effects on crime.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents some theoretical considerations on the relationship between income inequality and crime, and section 3 presents the income data and estimates permanent and transitory income for each county in Sweden. Section 4 discusses the econometric specification of the crime equations and the data to be used when estimating them. Section 5 presents the results, and, finally, section 6 concludes. correlated with social mobility, then these theories imply a higher prevalence of criminal behavior in more unequal areas.
Closely related to theories involving social mobility are those related to social disorganization and crime. In an influential paper, Merton (1938) proposes that the lack of upward mobility in a society, combined with a high premium on economic affluence results in anomie, a breakdown of standards and values. According to Merton, poverty or even "poverty in the midst of plenty" alone is not sufficient to induce high levels of crime. Only when their interaction with other interdependent social and cultural variables is considered, one can explain the association between crime and poverty.
The above theories, connecting crime to inequality, have spawned a large number of empirical studies. Most of these have estimated whether crime rates are affected by different measures of income inequality, using such measures as the Gini coefficient, the variance of log income, and different percentile quotients, like the 90/10-quotient. These different measures do however yield quite different conclusions in different studies. For example, while certain studies using US data find a significant and positive relation between the Gini coefficient and crime rates (see Freeman, 1999 , for an overview), Nilsson (2004) find no significant effects from the Gini coefficient on crime rates using Swedish data.
We believe that one explanation for the diverging results in the literature may be due to the use of an aggregate measure of income. It is a relatively old thought in economics, dating back at least to Friedman & Kuznets (1954) , that an individual's income in a given period can be divided into a permanent and a transitory component. Since changes in permanent and transitory income have different ramification for the duration of inequality, it is quite likely that they will have different impacts on the crime rates. From the sociological theories related to above, it is clear that it is an individual's permanent position in society that is the main factor affecting one's decision to commit crime or not, not the individual's transitory deviation from the permanent position. From the economic theories, it is however not clear whether it is inequality in permanent or in transitory income that matters. Using an aggregate measure of income, as the earlier studies have done, will however restrict inequality in permanent and transitory income to have the same impact.
To make the argument clear, consider the following model:
where it y is the log of total income in period t for individual i , (
that is, the variance of total income is the sum of the variance of permanent income and the variance of transitory income.
Equation (2) illustrates the potential pitfall of using total income. For example, suppose that changes in the variance of total income is used to study whether income inequality can explain differences in crime rates across different regions. If only permanent inequality affect crime rates, equation (2) shows that such a study has rather limited prospects of obtaining clear or systematic evidence. A region with both low inequality in permanent income and low crime rates may have a large dispersion in transitory earnings, and hence a large crosssectional variance in income. The results may hence show that inequality has no, or even a negative, effect on crime.
In the end, it is an empirical question whether inequality in permanent income has another impact on crime rates than inequality in transitory income. Therefore, the aim with this paper is to allow the two income components in equation (2) to have separate effects on the crime rates.
Permanent and transitory income

An econometric model of income dynamics
Even though the permanent earnings model presented in the preceding section is intuitive, an empirical model of income dynamics must have several additional properties. To begin with, the variance of income must be allowed to change over time. The following enhanced model allows for this: 4
In equation (3), the variable i u and its year-specific factor loading, t p , capture permanent, or persistent, income. As an approximation, the variable i u can be thought of as capturing all individual characteristics that matter for permanent relative income and t p as reflecting the time-varying price of these characteristics, but in practice, this specification is simply a means to allow the variance of permanent income to change over time. As before, the variable it ε capture stochastic transitory deviations from permanent income but its variance is now year specific, denoted 2 t ε σ . With this model, the variance of log income is (4) Changes in the permanent and transitory components are closely related to changes in measures of income mobility, ie changes in the rate at which individuals shift positions in the income distribution (transition across quantiles of the income distribution). Increases in the permanent component will cause the auto-covariances to grow in greater proportion than the variances, so auto-correlations increase. In contrast, increases in the transitory component alone will only increase the variances, so auto-correlations decrease. Equal proportional increases in the two components will leave auto-correlations unchanged, even though individual income instability will be increased. Changes in auto-correlations thus identify changes in the ratio of persistent to transitory income inequality. 5
Previous studies have shown that more additional features must be added to a model of income dynamics if one should correctly estimate changes in permanent and transitory inequality (see the discussion in Baker & Solon, 2003 , and the references therein). In particular, the permanent and transitory income components should be allowed to vary with age and transitory shocks should be allowed to last for several periods.
For each county separately, the following generalization of equation (3) 
where a indicates age. Beginning with the permanent component, equations (6) and (7) model permanent income as a random walk in age where the innovation at each age is 5 A more detailed discussion of the connection to income mobility can be found in Moffitt & Gottschalk (1995) . 6 Some of the models that we have experimented with produce negative estimates of some of the variances or show other clear signs of being over-specified -these models are naturally discarded. The model presented here is the most advanced possible without over-specifying the model. We have not applied Newey's (1985) specification test as the previous literature on income dynamics show that this test always (at least in the studies that we are aware of) rejects the hypothesis that the right model is specified. The drawbacks with this test for assessing the goodness of fit of models of income dynamics are further discussed in Baker (1997) and Baker & Solon (2003) . A general critic of tests such as that proposed in Newey (1985) is also found in Leamer (1983) . σ , is allowed to take on one value up until age 34 and another one thereafter. We also estimate the variance of an initial permanent shock that capture the accumulation of individuals' permanent shocks up to the start of the sample period, denoted 2 u σ . We found that not allowing for age varying permanent shocks produced noticeable different results as well as substantially larger standard errors for the estimated parameters. By allowing for age variation we recognize that younger individuals are more likely to be engaged in job-shopping and have no job-securing tenure and are therefore more likely to experience larger permanent shocks to income.
For the transitory component, a q in equation (6) is an age-specific parameter that permits the magnitude of the transitory component to vary with age. 8 It is allowed to take on three different values, one for individuals aged no more than 34 years, one for individuals aged 35
to 44, and one for individuals aged 45 and above. Like for the permanent component we found age variation to be important for the precision of the estimates. Equation (8) models deviations from permanent income as a first order autoregressive moving average process with a year-specific innovation ibt ν , which in turn has a year-specific variance, denoted 2 t v σ .
Although the model in equations (6)- (8) is more complex than that in equation (3), the intuition from the simpler model still holds. An increase in the permanent variance preserves the order of individuals in the income distribution but spreads them out further, and this greater spread remains year after year. An increase in the transitory variance leads to more scrambling of workers' order in the annual income distribution, and the scrambling gets redone every year.
Income data and estimation methodology
To calculate permanent and transitory income inequality from 1974 to 2000 we use the register-based longitudinal database LINDA, constructed to be cross-sectionally representative of the Swedish population each year. 9 The dataset is large; it contains 3.35 7 A random walk specification is also used, among others, in Dickens (2000) , Moffitt & Gottschalk (2002) , and Gustavsson (2004a, b) . The use of a "random growht model" for permanent earnigs results in negative estimates of some of its variances; the same results for Sweden is also found, and discussed, in Gustavsson (2004a, b) . 8 In this model, the terms "permanent" and "transitory" are questionable. To be consistent with previous studies, however, we use the term permanent for the non-mean reverting component and transitory for the mean reverting component. 9 The registers are maintained by Statistics Sweden; see Edin & Fredriksson (2000) for details. percent of the Swedish population each year corresponding to over 300,000 individuals. An attractive feature of the database is that attrition from the sample can be due only to death or migration. Information about individuals' incomes comes from tax reports, so the income variable is free of the measurement errors that are common in survey data such as recall errors, rounding errors and top-coding.
The definition of an individual's income used in the analysis is the log of total earnings from all jobs during a year (including sickness benefits); like Nilsson (2004) we use this income definition since it is the most consistent over time available in the LINDA database. 10
Consequently, our inequality measures will to a large extent reflect inequality in labor market outcomes. However, labor earnings are the primary source of income for a majority of people and therefore most likely highly correlated with alternative measures of income. 11
To estimate the parameters of equations (6)-(8) we employ the minimum distance estimator described in Chamberlain (1984) and Abowd & Card (1989) . This means that variances and auto-covariances of income constitute the dependent variable in the estimations. used in the US studies by Haider (2000) and Moffitt & Gottschalk (1995 , 2002 , and in several cases are larger.
In constructing the auto-covariance matrices for different cohorts we employ the methodology used by Moffitt & Gottschalk (1995 Each county's resulting auto-covariance matrix is used in the minimum distance estimation of equations (6)-(8). Basically, the implied variances and auto-covariances of the model are fitted to the corresponding empirical moments in the data by non-linear least squares. In these estimations the age of the cohort aged 20-29 is defined to be 25, the age of the cohort aged 30-39 is 35, and so forth. Appendix A contains a description of the estimation procedure.
Results
Here we will briefly describe the estimation results for three selected counties. 6 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 Year 4 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 Year
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Transitory var 16 For corresponding estimates for the whole of Sweden during this period, see Gustavsson (2004a, b) . 4 1974 1977 1980 1983 1986 1989 1992 1995 1998 Year Norrbotten. Transitory inequality also displays a stronger increase in Skåne and Norrbotten than in Stockholm during this period. Overall, there are some important cross-county differences in the evolution of inequality -especially during the 1990s. 25-year olds actually is largest in Norrbotten, but also that this is a quickly passing state as the age-inequality pattern is much steeper in Stockholm and Skåne. Hence, even if inequality is low in Stockholm among individuals aged 25, those with low expected permanent income over the life-cycle will have much lower expected relative income in the future than the corresponding 25-year old individuals in Norrbotten. Since, according to economic theories along the lines of Becker (1968) , expected future relative income is closely connected to the 18 Since, by construction, the proportional changes over time within a county are the same for all ages, we cannot include several different ages since these would be perfectly collinear.
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decision to commit crime, it is important to take account of the life-cycle differences across counties when estimating the connection between permanent inequality and crime rates.
To get measures of inequality that take account of the cross-county differences in life-cycle patterns, we compute the average permanent and transitory inequality over the life cycle for each county. That is, for a given year and county we calculate the permanent variance for each age (25, 26, and so forth up to 55), and then compute the average of these variances. The corresponding is done for transitory inequality. These averages of permanent and transitory inequality are the measures that we use in our estimated crime equations.
Data and econometric specification of crime equation
When estimating the crime equations, we will use panel data from Swedish counties. In the panel, we observe the 21 counties over the time period 1974-2000. We will investigate the effects of income inequality on four different types of crime: total crime, shoplifting, auto theft, and burglary. Time-series graphs of these crime categories are available in Appendix C 19 We assume that there is an underlying process that connects per capita crime rates, C it , and the two measures of income inequality, PERM it and TRANS it , in county i = 1, . . . , N at time t = 1, . . . , T such that where PERM it is the estimated inequality in permanent income and TRANS it is the estimated inequality in transitory income and where we are interested in estimating the parameters α and β. Since crime rates are non-negative, the exponential form is suitable. Furthermore, for the exponential form, any changes are proportional to the crime rate, which seems more plausible than for example constant changes produced by a linear relation.
In order to avoid misspecifications due to omitted variables, we control for observable as well as unobservable variables that might explain the crime rate and that might be correlated with the two inequality measures. The observable variables, x it , that we use are crime-specific clear-up rates (proxy for the probability of getting caught), unemployment rate, share of men in the age interval 15-24, share of foreign citizens, and share of the population that is divorced. 20 The unobservable variables are county-specific fixed effects, f i , to control for unobserved variables that affects the crime rate and that stay constant over time for each county, time-specific fixed effects, λ t , to control for unobserved macro-economic shocks that affect the crime rate in each county in the same way in a given year, and county-specific time trends, trend i . The fixed county-and time-effects might be correlated with the observable variables. Furthermore, the crime rate can also be affected by disturbances, ε it . Thus, we have the following relationship to be estimated for the crime rate
To estimate equation (9), we take the logarithm of it and use OLS to estimate the following familiar log-linear fixed effect model 21 :
There are three things that we have to deal with when estimating equation (10). First, it is quite likely that the disturbances are heteroscedastic. Crimes are discrete events and the number of crimes committed is an integer. While this is not a problem for larger populations, for smaller populations it is, since the discrete nature of the crimes then will transfer to the crime rate, which is our dependent variable. For a population of 5,000, one additional crime corresponds to 20 crimes per 100,000 inhabitants. Since the precision of crime rate estimates as a consequence will depend on the population size, we cannot expect the variance of the regression errors to be homoscedastic, if we estimate equation (10) with common methods.
The smaller the population is, the larger is the variance. 22 We take care of this problem by estimating robust standard errors. Second, if there is a serial correlation in the error process (that is, if the crime rates are serially correlated), the resulting standard errors are inconsistently estimated and may lead to severely biased estimates in small samples (see, eg 20 These are control variables that are typically used when estimating crime equations; see, eg, Raphael & Winter-Ebmer (2001) , Levitt & Donohue (2001) and Edmark (2005) . 21 The log-linear fixed effect model has been frequently used in papers estimating crime equations; see, eg, Raphael & Winter-Ebmer (2001) and the references cited therein. 22 See Osgood (2000) for a discussion in a cross-sectional setting. Kezdi, 2002, and Bertrand et al., 2004) . Therefore, we allow the errors to be correlated over time within each county. 23 Third, since PERM it and TRANS it are estimated variables, their estimated standard errors might be biased. To correct for this, we present bootstrapped confidence intervals for these two variables. 24
Results
For comparison reasons we start by using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income when calculating income inequality. Three measures are used: the predicted variance (which is the sum of the estimated variances in permanent and transitory income; cf equation (2)), the Gini coefficient, and the variance. The results of including these measures in equation (10) are presented in Table 1 .
If it is the case that permanent income has an effect on crime while transitory income does not, then we might end up with the false result of insignificant effects when using an aggregate income measure. This is also what we mainly get; none of the measures we use for income inequality enters significantly for the categories total crimes, auto theft and burglary. 25 For shoplifting, however, all three measures enter significantly at the five percent significance level, indicating that the larger the income inequality is, the more shoplifting we observe.
Next we turn to the, for the purpose of this paper, more interesting question of whether the results in Table 1 change when we separate aggregate income into a permanent and a transitory part. The results are presented in Table 2 . For each crime category, we present two different sets of estimates; in column (1) we present the results when we don't control for the crime-specific clear-up rate and in column (2) we present the results when we control for the clear-up rate. 26 The reason for this division is the potential problems the endogeneity of the clear-up rate might cause in interpreting the coefficients for the permanent and transitory income variables. 27 In parenthesis, we present the traditionally estimated standard errors.
However, for the two income variables these estimates are biased since the variables are estimated. Therefore, we rely on bootstrap confidence interval when making inference for the income variables. 28 98 percent bootstrap confidence intervals are presented within brackets.
From the results in Table 2 , it is clear that it is important to decompose income; while the inequality in permanent income enters statistically significant in all estimations (the four 98 percent bootstrap confidence intervals never cover the zero; as a matter of fact, all 1000 bootstrap estimates are positive for all crime categories), the inequality in transitory income never enters significantly. It hence seems like it is inequality in permanent income -and not in transitory income -that is important in determining property crime (it can be noted that, compared to the results in Table 1 , the result for shoplifting are strengthened when permanent income is used instead of aggregate income).
The results for the other variables in Table 1 and 2 are in line with those in previous studieswith the noticeable exception of the unemployment rate which enters insignificantly in all specifications but one. This result for the unemployment rate is perhaps not surprising as compared to the bulk of the earlier studies aiming at estimating the effect of unemployment on crime (for a discussion on this issue, see Raphael and Winter-Ebmer, 2001 ). However, it is rather surprising given the results in more recent work, such as Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001) , Nilsson and Agell (2003) , and Edmark (2005) . It is especially surprising given that we are using the same type of data as in Edmark (county-level data for Sweden). One explanation for the different results could be the disaggregation of the income variable into its two components, as done in this paper. However, from the results in Table 1 where total income is used, this does not seem to be the explanation. The main differences compared to the study by Edmark, besides the income variable, are that we have a longer time period (although covering the time period used by her) and a different functional form (she is using a log-log specification). This might indicate that the results for the unemployment variable can be sensitive to the choice of time period or choice of functional form. 28 In each bootstrap iteration, we first draw individuals with replacement from the income data base (ie, from the LINDA data base). Then we use the procedure presented in section 3 to estimate the county-specific inequalities in permanent and transitory income. Finally, we use the estimated county-specific inequalities in permanent and transitory income and estimate the crime equations. This procedure is repeated 1000 times, providing us with 1000 estimates on the coefficients for the two income variables. Notes. Robust standard errors are presented in parentheses. Time dummies, county-specific fixed effects and county-specific time trends are included in all specifications. Clustering is made on counties (allowing for autocorrelation in the residuals). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Clustering is made on counties (allowing for autocorrelation in the residuals). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
Conclusions
Earlier studies on income inequality and crime have used inequality in total income or total earnings as explanatory variable. However, from sociological theories on inequality and crime, it is rather an individual's permanent position in society that is the main factor affecting one's decision to commit crime or not, not the individual's transitory deviation from the permanent position, implying that it is the inequality in permanent income, and not in transitory income, that is the important determinant for crime. Although less clear, this can also be the prediction from economic theories. Using an aggregate measure of income, as the earlier studies have done, will however restrict inequality in permanent and transitory income to have the same impact, making it difficult to obtain systematic evidence if only one of the components matter (or if the two components matter to different degrees).
We have in this paper investigated whether the effects from inequality in permanent income on crime differ from the effects from inequality in transitory income on crime. To that end, we started out by estimating, using very rich income data from Sweden, region-specific inequality in permanent and transitory income. Then we used the two estimated income components as explanatory variables in four different crime equations; total crime, shoplifting, auto theft, and burglary.
The results indicate that it is crucially important to separate the two effects; while an increase in the inequality in permanent income yields a positive and significant effect on total crimes and the three different property crimes, an increase in the inequality in transitory income has no significant effect on any type of crime. Using a traditional, aggregate, measure of income yields mainly insignificant effects on crime.
where G is the gradient matrix ( ) f ∂ ∂ θ θ evaluated at θ and V is a block diagonal matrix where the diagonal contains the estimated covariance matrices of each b Ĉ vectors. Note: The estimated model is outlined in equations (6)-(8). The estimates for each county are based on 1004 variances and auto-covariances. Heteroskedasticity and auto-correlation robust standard errors are in parentheses.
Appendix B
Appendix D
In this appendix we present the results for permanent and transitory income when using weighted least squares. Notes. Robust standard errors in parentheses Time dummies, county-specific fixed effects and county-specific time trends are included in all specifications. Clusatering is made on counties (allowing for autocorrelation in the residuals). * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1%
